Goldman om att förvaltare inte gillar banker

För de som är intresserade av mäklarsidans synpunkter...

Goldman kommenterade i morse att investerare hatar banker... dvs, i mina ögon betyder det att det kan vara ett bättre köpläge än annars, förutsatt att man, vilket jag gör, tycker att vinstprognoserna är ok och värderingen ganska låg.

Largest monthly fall in PM sentiment towards the European banks sector in at least 9 years – now the most hated sector in Europe – most negative reading since March 2009. Financial Times: According to the latest survey conducted by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, the popularity rating of European banks dropped from 16 per cent in January to minus 53 per cent in February, the biggest monthly fall in the survey's nine-year history. It is the most negative investors have been on banks since the nadir of the financial crisis in March 2009 and the largest conviction underweight position for any sector seen by Merrill in seven months. A total of 165 fund managers managing a combined $355bn took part in the Europe regional survey.


Morgan Stanleys strateg Minack skrev i natt lite baissigt om skulder och hur jobbigt det är att bli av med dem:

Finally, deleveraging now is likely to be more difficult than usual. First, the adjustment is more difficult because it involves more countries. Prior debt crises typically involved regions that were, in a global macro context, relatively small. Even the Asian crisis of 1997-98 did not have a material impact on the developed economies. This time, however, high debt exists in economies that account for a very large proportion of global output. Increasing national saving is clearly easier to achieve in a buoyant global environment. Asia's adjustment, for example, was assisted by strength in developed economies. Now, however, a synchronized move to reduced leverage would have second round effects through the developed world, threatening a double-dip recession in developed economies.

The second difficulty is that the starting point is very elevated leverage. Prior successful deleveraging - that is, deleveraging that avoided default or serious economic distress - started from lower leverage levels. Of the episodes McKinsey identified, the highest starting point leverage for 'growing out of debt' was 180% of GDP. This is roughly half the level of leverage in many developed economies. Of episodes that required 'belt tightening' - but did not also include financial crisis - the highest leverage starting point was 242% of GDP. In other words, there is no historical precedent for an economy with debt to GDP of over 250% of GDP - many developed economies now have debt of around 350% of GDP - to avoid financial crisis (or inflation) as they de-lever.


Han hade dock en liten silver lining trots allt och menade att tillväxten inte behöver bli sämre för det, efter ett första skift nedåt:

Second, an extended period of de-leveraging does not require an extended period of sub-trend growth. This is for two reasons. First, the growth in debt is not linked to economic growth: it's the change in the rate of debt growth that affects economic growth. The stock of debt is like the stock of inventories: the change in inventories (or debt) affects the level of GDP; and it's the change in the change that affects the growth in GDP. Put another way, once spending is below income (saving is positive), leverage can be reduced even if spending growth is in line with income growth.