Merrills (Bank of America) fondförvaltarundersökning:
Global Survey: Summary
a. The June FMS shows investor’ growth expectations in danger of ‘double-dipping’, but
b. risk appetite has stabilized, and
c. equity valuation is the cheapest since March 2009.
Investor sentiment is defensive, but pessimism is not yet extreme enough for a big buy signal on risk assets.
However, such has been the scaling back of growth expectations that a simple absence of negative surprises on macro-data would be positive for equity markets.
European Survey: Summary European growth expectations have fallen back sharply. They are now hovering just above double-dip territory, with the European growth outlook at just +7% - two months ago it was at 62%. Similarly, profit growth expectations have fallen to +17%, from +72% in April. In fact the minority who are expecting a double dip has grown substantially to just over a third of respondents - two months ago that was around 10%.
A lot of bad news is now in the price European equities are seen as the cheapest in 6 years by local fund mangers, while Europe is also seen as the cheapest region by a clear majority of global investors.
On sectors Only minor changes this month; investors are modestly putting some money back into cyclicals at the expense of financials, but overall the conviction levels on overweights remain very, very low. Industrials is still the most-favoured sector, but at +22 is a very modest reading and the other overweights are muted at around +10. Banks and Real Estate are still the most hated sectors at -49% and -47%, respectively, and remain contrarian buys.
Min tolkning av ovanstående är att undersökningen utgör ett marginellt stöd för att det är läge att vara lång. Dylika enkäter ska dock inte tillmätas särskilt mycket vikt, men lite trevligt är det att höra att många är negativa... och inte minst underviktade i bank.
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tisdag 15 juni 2010
onsdag 17 februari 2010
Goldman om att förvaltare inte gillar banker
För de som är intresserade av mäklarsidans synpunkter...
Goldman kommenterade i morse att investerare hatar banker... dvs, i mina ögon betyder det att det kan vara ett bättre köpläge än annars, förutsatt att man, vilket jag gör, tycker att vinstprognoserna är ok och värderingen ganska låg.
Largest monthly fall in PM sentiment towards the European banks sector in at least 9 years – now the most hated sector in Europe – most negative reading since March 2009. Financial Times: According to the latest survey conducted by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, the popularity rating of European banks dropped from 16 per cent in January to minus 53 per cent in February, the biggest monthly fall in the survey's nine-year history. It is the most negative investors have been on banks since the nadir of the financial crisis in March 2009 and the largest conviction underweight position for any sector seen by Merrill in seven months. A total of 165 fund managers managing a combined $355bn took part in the Europe regional survey.
Morgan Stanleys strateg Minack skrev i natt lite baissigt om skulder och hur jobbigt det är att bli av med dem:
Finally, deleveraging now is likely to be more difficult than usual. First, the adjustment is more difficult because it involves more countries. Prior debt crises typically involved regions that were, in a global macro context, relatively small. Even the Asian crisis of 1997-98 did not have a material impact on the developed economies. This time, however, high debt exists in economies that account for a very large proportion of global output. Increasing national saving is clearly easier to achieve in a buoyant global environment. Asia's adjustment, for example, was assisted by strength in developed economies. Now, however, a synchronized move to reduced leverage would have second round effects through the developed world, threatening a double-dip recession in developed economies.
The second difficulty is that the starting point is very elevated leverage. Prior successful deleveraging - that is, deleveraging that avoided default or serious economic distress - started from lower leverage levels. Of the episodes McKinsey identified, the highest starting point leverage for 'growing out of debt' was 180% of GDP. This is roughly half the level of leverage in many developed economies. Of episodes that required 'belt tightening' - but did not also include financial crisis - the highest leverage starting point was 242% of GDP. In other words, there is no historical precedent for an economy with debt to GDP of over 250% of GDP - many developed economies now have debt of around 350% of GDP - to avoid financial crisis (or inflation) as they de-lever.
Han hade dock en liten silver lining trots allt och menade att tillväxten inte behöver bli sämre för det, efter ett första skift nedåt:
Second, an extended period of de-leveraging does not require an extended period of sub-trend growth. This is for two reasons. First, the growth in debt is not linked to economic growth: it's the change in the rate of debt growth that affects economic growth. The stock of debt is like the stock of inventories: the change in inventories (or debt) affects the level of GDP; and it's the change in the change that affects the growth in GDP. Put another way, once spending is below income (saving is positive), leverage can be reduced even if spending growth is in line with income growth.
Goldman kommenterade i morse att investerare hatar banker... dvs, i mina ögon betyder det att det kan vara ett bättre köpläge än annars, förutsatt att man, vilket jag gör, tycker att vinstprognoserna är ok och värderingen ganska låg.
Largest monthly fall in PM sentiment towards the European banks sector in at least 9 years – now the most hated sector in Europe – most negative reading since March 2009. Financial Times: According to the latest survey conducted by Bank of America Merrill Lynch, the popularity rating of European banks dropped from 16 per cent in January to minus 53 per cent in February, the biggest monthly fall in the survey's nine-year history. It is the most negative investors have been on banks since the nadir of the financial crisis in March 2009 and the largest conviction underweight position for any sector seen by Merrill in seven months. A total of 165 fund managers managing a combined $355bn took part in the Europe regional survey.
Morgan Stanleys strateg Minack skrev i natt lite baissigt om skulder och hur jobbigt det är att bli av med dem:
Finally, deleveraging now is likely to be more difficult than usual. First, the adjustment is more difficult because it involves more countries. Prior debt crises typically involved regions that were, in a global macro context, relatively small. Even the Asian crisis of 1997-98 did not have a material impact on the developed economies. This time, however, high debt exists in economies that account for a very large proportion of global output. Increasing national saving is clearly easier to achieve in a buoyant global environment. Asia's adjustment, for example, was assisted by strength in developed economies. Now, however, a synchronized move to reduced leverage would have second round effects through the developed world, threatening a double-dip recession in developed economies.
The second difficulty is that the starting point is very elevated leverage. Prior successful deleveraging - that is, deleveraging that avoided default or serious economic distress - started from lower leverage levels. Of the episodes McKinsey identified, the highest starting point leverage for 'growing out of debt' was 180% of GDP. This is roughly half the level of leverage in many developed economies. Of episodes that required 'belt tightening' - but did not also include financial crisis - the highest leverage starting point was 242% of GDP. In other words, there is no historical precedent for an economy with debt to GDP of over 250% of GDP - many developed economies now have debt of around 350% of GDP - to avoid financial crisis (or inflation) as they de-lever.
Han hade dock en liten silver lining trots allt och menade att tillväxten inte behöver bli sämre för det, efter ett första skift nedåt:
Second, an extended period of de-leveraging does not require an extended period of sub-trend growth. This is for two reasons. First, the growth in debt is not linked to economic growth: it's the change in the rate of debt growth that affects economic growth. The stock of debt is like the stock of inventories: the change in inventories (or debt) affects the level of GDP; and it's the change in the change that affects the growth in GDP. Put another way, once spending is below income (saving is positive), leverage can be reduced even if spending growth is in line with income growth.
måndag 20 april 2009
Jag fick (kanske) min katastrof
Hur pålitlig är läckan som säger att de amerikanska stresstesten visar på 16 av 19 stora banker i insolvens, inklusive de fem största?
Hursomhelst verkar marknaden handla (ner) på det. Vidare så imponerade inte Bank of America med sin rapport idag, trots en massivt bättre EPS-siffra än väntat (ca 10x förväntan). Svag outlook och mycket sämre kreditkvalitet vägde dock upp tveksam uthållighet i rapporterade intäkter och vinster.
Tillfälligt (åtminstone) hjälper det min negativa position i marknaden. Jag sitter nöjd.
Hursomhelst verkar marknaden handla (ner) på det. Vidare så imponerade inte Bank of America med sin rapport idag, trots en massivt bättre EPS-siffra än väntat (ca 10x förväntan). Svag outlook och mycket sämre kreditkvalitet vägde dock upp tveksam uthållighet i rapporterade intäkter och vinster.
Tillfälligt (åtminstone) hjälper det min negativa position i marknaden. Jag sitter nöjd.
Tillägg 15:15: US treasury förnekar att stresstesten skulle vara klara
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